We address the problem of identifying misbehaving nodes that refuse to forward packets in wireless multi-hop networks. We map the process of locating the misbehaving nodes to the classic Rényi-Ulam game of 20 questions. Compared to previous methods, our mapping allows the evaluation of node behavior on a per-packet basis, without the need for energy-expensive overhearing techniques or intensive acknowledgment schemes. Furthermore, it copes with colluding adversaries that coordinate their behavioral patterns to avoid identification and frame honest nodes. We show via simulations that our algorithms reduce the communication overhead for identifying misbehaving nodes by at least one order of magnitude compared to other methods, while increasing the identification delay logarithmically with the path size.
Introduction
Multi-hop networks, such as wireless ad-hoc, sensor, and mesh networks rely on collaboration among network nodes to provide reliable data services. If the destination is not within the communication range of the source, data has to be relayed by intermediate nodes. Implicit in this relay process is the assumption that intermediate nodes are willing to forward traffic other than their own.
However, a fraction of nodes may not conform to the specifications of collaborative routing protocols. Sophisticated users can misconfigure their devices to behave in a selfish manner and drop relay traffic, in order to save energy resources [8, 9, 34] . Moreover, in hostile environments, an adversary may compromise several nodes and configure them to misbehave. It has been shown that even a small fraction of misbehaving nodes refusing to relay packets, can lead to a significant drop in the overall network performance [6, 7, 20, 21] . In this paper, we address the problem of developing resource-efficient methods for identifying nodes that refuse to collaborate in relaying packets. We define resource efficiency in terms of the communication overhead associated with the identification of all misbehaving nodes along a routing path.
Previously proposed solutions addressing routing misbehavior can be classified to reputation-based systems [6, 7, 21] , credit-based systems [8, 9, 16, 34] , and acknowledgment-based systems [1, 2, 18, 20, 23] . A common element in all these solutions is the evaluation of node behavior on a per-packet basis. This approach provides a fine granularity in quantifying the behavior of nodes and low delay in identifying the misbehaving ones. However, it expends energy (in the form of receptions or transmissions) on a per-packet basis. For example, in acknowledgment-based systems, packets must be acknowledged two or more hops upstream [2, 1], thus consuming energy and bandwidth.
We develop a communication-efficient solution that allows the per-packet evaluation of behavior while not incurring the per-packet overhead. Nodes themselves are responsible for monitoring the packets they receive and forward to the next hop. When misbehavior is observed on a particular path, the source requests from nodes along the path to commit to a proof of the packets they receive and forward via an audit process (similar to [18, 1] ). Although misbehaving nodes may lie about the packets they forward, the source combines multiple audit replies from honest nodes to identify the misbehaving ones.
Our Contributions:
We map the problem of misbehavior identification to the classic Rényi-Ulam game of 20 questions [29, 32] . Rényi-Ulam games have been extensively used in various contexts including error correction codes [3], selecting, sorting, and searching in the presence of errors [25, 30, 31] , to name a few. We develop communication-efficient algorithms for locating misbehaving nodes, based on different versions of Rényi-Ulam games. Our mapping allows the perpacket evaluation of node behavior without incurring the per-packet communication overhead. Furthermore, our formulation addresses colluding adversaries who coordinate their attacks to avoid identification and frame honest nodes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present related work. In Section 3, we state the problem and our model assumptions. In Section 4, we map the misbehavior identification problem to Rényi-Ulam games and develop two auditing (searching) strategies. In Section 5, we present an efficient method for constructing audits. In Section 6, we compare the performance of our algorithms to previously proposed schemes. In Section 7, we conclude.
Related Work
Previously proposed methods for addressing the misbehavior problem can be classified into three categories: (a) credit-based systems, e.g., [8, 9, 16, 34] , (b) reputation-based systems, e.g., [14, 7, 13, 21, 6, 22] , and (c) acknowledgment-based systems, e.g., [1, 2, 20, 23] .
Credit-Based Systems: Credit-based systems [8, 34, 9, 16] are designed to provide incentives for forwarding packets in the form of credit payments. Nodes accumulate credit that can be later used to pay for sending their own traffic. Buttyan et al. [8, 9] proposed a scheme in which a nuglet counter is used to tabulate the amount of credit accumulated at each node. To prevent tampering with the accumulated credit, the nuglet counter is implemented in tamper proof hardware. Zhong et al. [34] proposed Sprite, in which nodes collect receipts for the packets
